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SAVING 17200: AN ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSITION 64
Jacquetta Lannan*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2004, the citizens of California passed
Proposition 64, a citizens' referendum1 that modified
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").2 California's
UCL had a long history of protecting consumers from unfair
business practices, but in the years preceding the election, the
UCL received negative publicity after news articles revealed
that five attorneys had been sanctioned or investigated for
abusing the broad definitions of the UCL. The result of this
publicity was the passage of Proposition 64, which eliminated
the broad standing definition under the law, thereby making
it more difficult for consumer protection attorneys to
safeguard consumers from unfair business practices.
Following the passage of Proposition 64, state budget cuts
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., Philosophy, Smith College. Thanks to
Scott Maurer and Catherine Sandoval, Assistant Professor of Law, for your
helpful comments. Special thanks to Robert Nuddleman for your inspiration
and critique of this comment, as well as your friendship and mentorship.
1. Proposition 64 was a citizens' initiative, as opposed to a measure placed
on the ballot by the legislature. Citizens must either file the proposition with
the Attorney General and then get the requisite number of voter signatures, or
citizens must appeal to the legislature to put the referendum on the ballot.
SEC'Y OF STATE KEVIN SHELLEY, A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES 4 (Dec.
2002).
2. California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200-17209. were
collectively referred to by the California Supreme Court as the Unfair
Competition Law (UCL). While the Legislature has never annotated these
statutes as the UCL, in practice, most courts and practitioners use this common
acronym. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, 950 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1998).
3. See Steven Lawrence, Big Companies Fight Competition Law; Those
Targeted by Law Contribute to Proposition 64 Campaign, MONTEREY COUNTY
HERALD, July 12, 2004, at 3 [hereinafter Lawrence, Big CompaniesFight].
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eliminated many consumer protection groups, resulting in
increased consumer susceptibility to harmful practices and a
variety of consumer injuries.4
California's UCL has been used to enjoin a wide array of
abuses. For example, the law was invoked in a variety of
contexts, including enjoining convenience stores from selling
cigarettes to minors5 and a hospital from enforcing a binding
arbitration clause against the son of a patient who died of
breast cancer.6 The UCL has been used to target credit
institutions for failing to disclose fees and for issuing
misleading credit offerings.7 Even environmental advocates
have successfully used the UCL to deter and prevent harmful
water and soil pollution.'
Prior to the passage of Proposition 64, the UCL was
unusual because it allowed plaintiffs without standing to
bring an action on behalf of the general public.9 Virtually
every other statute requires that a plaintiff be subject to some
harm in order to have standing to sue. Since the passage of
Proposition 64, plaintiffs must be injured by an unfair
business practice to have standing. 10
Further, with the
passage of Proposition 64, plaintiffs must comply with
California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 when bringing
a UCL class action." This may mean that plaintiffs need to
certify their claims as class actions in order to obtain relief on
behalf of persons other than named plaintiffs. This poses a
difficulty to consumer protection lawyers hoping to protect
consumers from future unfair business practices.
This comment explores how Proposition 64 failed to
prevent unscrupulous attorneys from abusing the UCL and
how it also had the unfortunate effect of eliminating many of
the UCL's broad consumer protection qualities. Part II of this
comment introduces the historical origins of California's

4. See Esther Landhuis, Nail Salons Board Target of Budget Ax, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2005, at lB.
5. Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1086.
6. Thomas L. Van Wyngarden, Rising Trends in California's Unfair
Competition Law, L.A. Bus. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 34.
7. Id.
8. Lawrence, Big CompaniesFight,supra note 3, at 3.
9. Standing is a "party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial
enforcement of a duty or right." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004).
10.

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (Deering 2004).

11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (Deering 2004).
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UCL 12 and explains its substantive reach and procedures.

3

In addition, it details the unusual standing rules of the UCL
prior to Proposition 64,14 illustrates the publicity caused by a
few unscrupulous lawsuits, 5 and identifies problems with the
Part III describes the
UCL prior to Proposition 64.16
problems inherent in California's UCL that Proposition 64
failed to address. 7 Part IV analyzes the purported rationale
for the modifications to the UCL leading up to the November
2004 election. 8 Part V proposes three additions to the UCL
to discourage frivolous lawsuits, 9 protect businesses against
multiple UCL suits, 20 and provide ethical attorneys more

power to protect the public against harmful business
practices.21
II.

BACKGROUND

A. History of the California Unfair Competition Law
California's UCL22 grew out of common law principles of
Unfair
trademark and tradename infringement.23
competition at common law was an equitable doctrine that
protected businesses from competitors attempting to pirate
labor or otherwise gain an unearned economic benefit.24
Traditionally, causes of action for unfair competition between

12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.D.1.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See infra Part II.E.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See infra Part V.A.
20. See infra Part V.B.
21. See infra Part V.C.
22. The set of statutes which comprise the UCL does not have a legislatively
imposed name. Most recently the group has been referred to by courts as the
"Unfair Competition Law" or UCL. See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky
Stores, 950 P.2d 1086, 1086 (Cal. 1998); Comm. on Children's Television v. Gen.
Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983); ABC Int'l Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp., 931 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1997).
23. See WILLIAM R. STERN, BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE §17200
PRACTICE 2-1 (2004).

24. See id.; KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(ex-employee wearing company chicken suit did not constitute unfair
competition because he did not wear the company logo or otherwise imply that
he worked for the company).

454

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 46

competitors required proof of public deception or public
confusion25 and public identification of some name or design
26
connected to the goods or services of the plaintiff.
Consumers, on the other hand, had no standing to allege
unfair competition even if they were the ones ultimately
harmed by deviant or dishonest business practices. 2
Thus,
2s
caveat emptor prevailed, and consumers who were victims of
unfair business practices lacked recourse under the UCL.2 9
In 1933, the California legislature modified Civil Code
section 3369,10 and effectively created the State's first UCL 1
Section 3369, originally enacted in 1872, was little more than
a codification of nuisance doctrine 32 and was not used to
combat unfair competition until 1933. 33
The 1933

25. See STERN, supra note 23, at 2-1.
26. See Lutz v. De Laurentiis, 260 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(titling and advertising a movie to mislead the public into believing the film was
the anticipated sequel to a movie produced by plaintiffs was unfair competition).
27. See STERN, supra note 23, at 2-1.
28. Caveat emptor is Latin for "let the buyer beware." This doctrine holds
that 'purchasers buy at their own risk." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note

9, at 236.
29. See STERN, supra note 23, at 2-1 to 2-2.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (1933) (current version at CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17200) (Deering 2004)). The 1933 version of section 3369 read:
Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a
penalty of forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a penal law, except in a
case of nuisance or unfair competition. Any person performing or
proposing to perform an act of unfair competition within this state may
be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. As used in this
section, unfair competition shall mean and include unfair or fraudulent
business practices and unfair, untrue or misleading advertising and
any act denounced by Penal Code sections 654(a), 654(b) or 654(c). As
used in this section, the term "person" shall mean and include natural
persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies,
associations and other organizations of persons. Actions for injunctions
under this section may be prosecuted by the Attorney General or any
district attorney in the name of the people of the State of California
upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of any board, officer,
person, corporation, or association or by any person acting for the
interest of itself, its members, or the general public.
Id.
31. See STERN, supra note 23, at 2-2.
32. See id.
33. Id. Original California Civil Code section 3369 read: 'Neither specific
nor preventative relief can be granted to enforce a penal law, except in a case of
nuisance, nor to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case," and merely created
a "nuisance" exception to the common law rule that violations of criminal
statutes cannot be enjoined. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (1872) (amended 1933).
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amendment to section 3369 had two substantial effects. 4
First, the amendment represented the end of the
unfair
toward
attitude
faire
laissez
government's
Second, the 1933 amendment illustrated
competition.3 5
California's need to protect consumers 36 by enabling them to
initiate civil actions to stop unfair business practices, both on
their own behalf and on behalf of the public."
Despite a number of minor amendments, the language of
the statute has remained intact since the 1933 amendment.38
Until the 1960s, attorneys used the statute mainly to
and
trademark
tradename
reinforce
common-law
infringement causes of action. 9 In 1977, California's UCL
was recodified in the Business and Professions Code, where it
remains today.4 °
B. Substantive and ProceduralScope of the UCL
1.

Conduct Prohibitedby California'sUCL

The UCL lists five different kinds of prohibited conduct:
(1) unlawful business acts or practices;4 1 (2) unfair business43
acts or practices; 42 (3) fraudulent business acts or practices;

34. See STERN, supra note 23, at 2-3.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369 (1933).
38. See STERN, supra note 23, at 1-2. The most important amendments to
section 17200 include: the 1963 amendment, which added the term "unlawful"
to the list of prohibited practices; the 1977 amendment, which recodified the
statutes in to the Business and Professions Code; and the 1992 amendment,
which expanded the law to include one-time acts, instead of only ongoing acts.
Id.
39. Id.
40. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17209 (Deering 2004).
41. Id. This prong of the law is unique compared to similar statutes in
other states because it allows plaintiffs to bring causes of action if the purported
unfair practice violates another law. See Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass'n,
496 P.2d 817, 828 (Cal. 1972) (plaintiffs brought suit against defendant
collection agency for repeatedly violating civil procedure laws). The term
.unlawful" has come to be defined as "anything that can properly be called a
business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law." Id. at 826.
42. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200. Unfair practices do not also need to
be unlawful or deceptive. See, e.g, Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel.
Co., 973 P.2d 527, 561 (Cal. 1999). Unfairness has been defined as "conduct
that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or
spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a
violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition."
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(4) unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising; 44 and
(5) acts prohibited by Business and Professions Code sections
1750045 through 17577.5.46 The remedies available under the
UCL are set forth in section 17203, which enables courts to
"enjoin" and "enter other equitable judgments" to "restore to
any person in interest any money or property, real or
personal, which may have been acquired by means of such
unfair competition."47 Plaintiffs are not entitled to any other
remedy under the law.
2.

Remedies Available Under the UCL

The UCL provides two categories of penalties to private
plaintiffs in order to deter unfair competition: injunctive relief
and restitution.48 Courts have liberally construed the UCL in
order to serve the legislative purpose of protecting the

Id. at 544. This clause is intentionally broad and allows courts the maximum
amount of discretion. See Motors, Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 543
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
43. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. The test for "fraudulent" business
practices is significantly different from common law fraud. With respect to
section 17200, a business practice is fraudulent if "members of the public are
likely to be deceived." Comm. on Children's Television v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673
P.2d 660, 672 (Cal. 1983).
44. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200. Because the fourth prong of section
17200 is significantly similar to the third prong, courts often do not distinguish
the two. See STERN, supra note 23, at 3-58.
45. California Business & Professions Code section 17500 is often referred to
as the "False Advertising Law" or the "False and Misleading Advertising
Statute." See STERN, supra note 23, at 3-2.
46. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200.
47. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203. The statute reads in full:
Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair
competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction.
The court may make such orders or judgments, including the
appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or
employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair
competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to
restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or
personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair
competition. Any person may pursue representative claims or relief on
behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements
of Section 17204 and complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, but these limitations do not apply to claims brought under
this chapter by the Attorney General, or any district attorney, country
counsel, city attorney, or city prosecutor in this state.
Id.
48. Id. Civil monetary penalties can be awarded when law enforcement
officials bring the action. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206.
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public.49 As one court explained, "it would be impossible to
draft in advance detailed plans and specifications of all acts
and conduct to be prohibited, since unfair or fraudulent
business practices may run the gamut of human ingenuity
and chicanery.""
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n 1 held that courts
could "enjoin on-going wrongful business conduct in whatever
context such activity may occur, "52 including any "unlawful,
unfair, or [deceptive] business practice," whether the practice
harmed competitors or consumers.5 3 Courts have enjoined
companies from a wide variety of activities. For instance, a
collection agency was prohibited from filing actions against
debtors in an improper county; 54 a publishing company was
prohibited from selling forms that were intentionally made to
look like important government-issued questionnaires;556
retailers were restricted from selling cigarettes to minors;
and a dairy was prohibited from advertising its milk as "safe,"
"pure," and produced under the "highest standards" when the
milk actually contained harmful and potentially dangerous
bacteria.
Courts have broad discretion in awarding restitution
under the UCL: "a court of equity may exercise the full range
of its inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice
between the parties, restoring if necessary the status quo ante
as nearly as may be achieved." 8 For example, restitution has
been awarded to customers defrauded by door-to-door
encyclopedia salesmen 59 and to employees who were never
paid overtime wages.6 0 Restitution under the UCL, however,

49. See, e.g., People v. Nat'l Research Co. of Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962).

50. Id. at 521.
51. Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 830 (Cal. 1972).
52. Id. at 829.
53. Id. (alteration in original).
54. See id. at 831.
55. Nat'l Research Co. of Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19.
56. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, 950 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Cal.
1998).
57. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Alta-Dena Certified Dairy, 6 Cal. Rptr.
2d 193, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
58. People v. Superior Court, 507 P.2d 1400, 1402 (Cal. 1973).
59. Id. at 1404.
60. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 706 (Cal.
2000).
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is not as broad as in certified class actions. For example,
when it is impossible to restore money directly to victims,
defendants in UCL actions are not required to repay
undeserved gains. 61 By contrast, in a certified class action,
such funds generally do not revert to the defendant, but must
be disgorged into a fluid recovery fund.62 Further, in a UCL
action, a court is not required to grant restitution even if it
finds the defendant liable.63
3. Attorneys' Fees Under the UCL
The UCL does not expressly award attorneys' fees, yet
this was a common misconception during the Proposition 64
campaign.64 Prior to Proposition 64, as well as today, there
are three circumstances under which an attorney can obtain
fees. First, fees can be obtained if the lawsuit involves a
contract that contains a provision for attorneys' fees.65
Second, when the lawsuit involves another statute containing
a provision for attorneys' fees for a prevailing party,
attorneys' fees can be awarded.66 Third, attorneys' fees can be
awarded if the lawsuit enforces an important right on behalf
of the general public or a significant population.6 ' This is
known as the Private Attorney General Doctrine.6"
The Private Attorney General Doctrine recognizes that
"privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the
effectuation of fundamental public policies." 69 By awarding

attorneys' fees, lawyers who were previously unable to take
61. See, e.g., Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc. 999 P.2d 718 (Cal. 2000).
62. Id. at 726.
63. Cortez, 999 P.2d at 712.
64. Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 539
(Cal. 1999) (citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545 (Cal.
1992)).
65. Contract-based attorneys' fees are only applicable when the cause of
action is rooted in a contract-based claim in addition to other claims. See, e.g.,
Xuereb v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 154, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(allowing attorneys' fees when the contract read "lawsuit or other legal
proceeding to which this Agreement gives rise").
66. See STERN, supra note 23, at 8-30. Generally, statutory awards come
from the underlying statue in an unfair competition claim for an "unlawful"
business practice. Id. at 8-31.
67. Id. at 8-30.
68. See, e.g., Cal. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (Deering 2004) (outlining
California's requirements for awarding fees under the Private Attorney General
Doctrine).
69. See STERN, supra note 23, at 8-30.
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these types of cases for financial reasons are able to do so if
the cases are in the public interest. 70
Not all actions,
however, serve the public interest to such extent as to
warrant an award of attorneys' fees.71
For example, in
CaliforniaLicensed ForestersAss'n v. California State Board
of Forestry,72 the court denied attorneys' fees to a lawyer who
brought an action on behalf of the seven hundred members of
the California Licensed Foresters because the members were
not representative of the public.7 3 Further, in Baxter v.
Salutary Sportsclubs, Inc.," the plaintiffs' attorney was
denied fees because no significant public benefit was
conferred by filing a suit against the defendants for unfair
and illegal clauses in their membership contracts. 7 The court
also found that the injunctive relief was too minor to justify
an award of attorneys' fees.7 6 In contrast, the court in
Planned Parenthood v. Aakuhas 7 awarded fees to lawyers
who sued to enjoin protestors from interrupting the plaintiff's
business because the action was beyond a "self-serving,
private dispute commenced by [the clinic] to protect its own
pocketbook."78 The distinction rests upon whether the action
is brought on behalf of the public at large as opposed to a
large group of self-interested parties.
Courts must find that four requirements are satisfied in
order to award attorneys' fees under the Private Attorney
General Doctrine. 79 First, the court must find that the action
will have an important effect on the public interest. 0 Second,
the court must conclude that the general public or a large

70. See Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 593 P.2d 200, 208
(Cal. 1979).
71. Eliot G. Disner & Noah E. Jussim, So Unfair and Foul, L.A. LAW., Nov.
26, 2003, at 42 (citing Larry Rand, CaliforniaAttorney General Sues Law Firm
for Sham Suits againstNail Salons, DAILY PRESS, July 10, 2003).
72. Cal. Licensed Foresters Ass'n v. Cal. State Bd. of Forestry, 35 Cal. Rptr.
2d 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
73. See id. at 400.
74. Baxter v. Salutary Sportsclubs, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004).
75. Id. at 320-21.
76. Id. at 322.
77. Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
78. Id. at 516.
79. See Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45.
80. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (Deering 2004).
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class of persons has been conferred a significant benefit."1
Next, the "necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement" must justify an award of attorneys' fees. 2
Finally, in the interest of justice, attorneys' fees cannot be
paid out of the recovery. 3
C. Issues with the UCL Priorto Proposition64
1.

The ControversialStanding Requirement Under the
UCL

One of the most controversial aspects of the UCL prior to
Proposition 64 was that anyone, even someone not directly
affected or injured by the prohibited action, could bring a
lawsuit under the UCL on behalf of the public.84 In almost all
other cases in California and elsewhere, standing is required
before a plaintiff can sue.8 5 As one court explained, "this rule
[requiring standing] is designed to protect a defendant from a
multiplicity of suits and from further annoyance and
vexation, and to fix and determine the real liability which is
alleged in the complaint." 6 California's UCL, compared to
similar statutes in other states, was the broadest in the
country prior to Proposition 64.87
The broad standing
definition contributed to the most controversial UCL issues,
including abuses by attorneys, multi-front lawsuits, and vast
representative actions.
2. Perceived UCL Abuses
During the spring of 2004, several examples of attorneys'
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 2004); STERN, supra note 23,
at 7-1. Standing is discussed in section 17204. Since the original 1933 statute,
the Attorney General, the district attorney, or "any person acting for the
interests of itself, its members, or the general public," is allowed to sue to enjoin
acts of unfair competition. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (1933).
85. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 367. The text of section 367 reads: "Every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Id.
86. Bank of the Orient v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. Rptr. 741, 744 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977).
87. See ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION ACT:
CONUNDRUMS AND CONFUSIONS, CALIFORNIA LAw REvISION COMMISSION

STUDY 8 (Jan. 1995), available at http'/www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/BKST/BKSTUnfairCompetition.pdf.
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abuse of the broad standing provision of the UCL received
The lawyers in those cases filed
significant publicity.8"
actions that theoretically were legally sound."9 For example,
in one such case, an attorney filed actions against nail salons
that purportedly used nail polish from the same bottle on
multiple customers, in violation of statute. 90 These salons,
therefore, had technically committed an "unlawful" business
practice prohibited by the UCL.9 ' The Bar Association's
subsequent sanctioning of the attorneys, however, was not
based on their filing lawsuits under the UCL, but rather for
ethical violations committed in conjunction with the
lawsuits. 92 These violations included misrepresenting to
93
banks the State Attorney General's support of their actions,
misinforming a charity of lawsuits purportedly filed on its
behalf,94 threatening audits, 95 sending settlement letters with
misleading information, 96 making false promises that
settlements would bar any further action against them, 97 and
requiring settlements to be confidential. 9
However, attorney misconduct has only tainted a small
fraction of UCL cases, and many legitimate and meritorious
lawsuits have used the UCL to achieve positive ends.9 9 For
years, the UCL has been an important tool to protect both
consumers and ethical businesses from unfair competition. 0 0
For example, Kaiser Hospital's use of a binding arbitration

88. Jennifer Coleman, Judge Fines Lawyer for 'Shakedown" Lawsuits,
MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, Oct. 21, 2004, at 2.

89. See id.
90. Nancy McCarthy, Trevor Lawyers Face Disbarment, CAL. BAR. J., July
2003, at 7, available at http-//calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/cbj.jsp [follow "Archived
Issues" hyperlink, then select "July 2003" hyperlink, then select "Trevor
Lawyers Face Disbarment" hyperlink].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. McCarthy, supra note 90, at 7.
97. Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 44.
98. McCarthy, supra note 90, at 7.
99. See Lisa Mufioz, Lawyer Accused of Frivolous Suits Fined, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Oct. 21, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Mufioz, Lawyer Accused]. For
examples of lawsuits using the UCL to reach such positive results, see Van
Wyngarden, supra note 6, at 34.
100. Evan Pondel, Baiting the Hook Prop. 64 on the November Ballot has
Business and Consumers Divided, DAILY NEWs, Aug. 15, 2004, at B1.
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clause was challenged by the son of a patient who died of
breast cancer. 10 1 In addition, the UCL was used to enjoin
Safeway from re-labeling outdated meat for resale. 2 Public
health advocates used the UCL to enjoin food companies from
marketing sugary candy cereals as "healthy."0 3 Other cases
forced the reduction of toxic emissions from tanker docks at
After the 1994 Northridge
Southern California ports.0
Earthquake, a nonprofit organization used the UCL to collect
tens of millions of dollars owed by State Farm Insurance to
homeowners whose homes were destroyed.' 0 5 A Los Angelesbased company was sued under the UCL for falsely
advertising to low-income Latinos that the company sold
water filters when it actually sold water softeners. °6 Online
auctioneers and trading websites were enjoined for
misleading advertising and consumer fraud.' 0 7 These are just
a few examples of the public benefits of UCL actions that
strongly outweigh the few perceived abuses.
3. Simultaneous Public, Private,and Administrative
Lawsuits
Under the UCL, both prior to Proposition 64 and today,
defendants can be sued simultaneously by private plaintiffs,
the attorney general, and administrative agencies for exactly
the same unfair business conduct, causing expensive
litigation for the defendant in both time and resources.' ° The
courts have interpreted the statute to permit private suits
even if there is a parallel law enforcement action.'0 9 Thus,
"the necessity of appellants' private pursuit of the present
action is not foreclosed merely because they failed to obtain
the approval of the district attorney before or after they filed
the same, or solely on the basis of whether a subsequent

101. Id.
102. Steve Johnson, Activists Try to Stop Lawsuit Proposal, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 26, 2004, at C1.
103. Id.
104. Our Views, TULARE ADVANCE-REG., Oct. 25, 2004, at 10.
105. Pondel, supra note 100, at B1.
106. Id. Consumers were falsely told they were buying a product that would
clean their water, making it safer to drink. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. A Free Pregnancy Ctr., 280
Cal. Rptr. 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
109. See, e.g., id.
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Therefore,
similar action was filed by the People."11 °
defendants are occasionally subject to both private and public
actions for the same prohibited behavior."' However, cases
in which both a private party and a public entity seek "relief
conferring a public benefit against a common private
defendant" are particularly rare." 2
Similarly, civil actions brought under the UCL are not
precluded because of the existence of parallel administrative
Thus, defendants might have to defend
proceedings."'
themselves in three separate lawsuits: one with a private
party, one with the Attorney General, and another with an
administrative agency. 1 4 Courts defend this system, stating:
The enforcement of administrative regulations and the
civil proceedings to compel the cessation of unlawful or
unfair business practices are two separate legal processes
involving two separate, distinct law enforcement agencies.
The commencement of an administrative action . . .does
not restrain the authority delegated by law to the district
attorney. One branch of government may not prevent
5
another from performing official acts required by law."
Administrative and Attorney General actions are filed for
different reasons." 6 For example, in Setliff Bros. Service v.
Bureau of Automotive Repair, an automotive repair shop
defended separate actions brought by the Attorney General
under the UCL, as well as a separate action by the
Department of Consumer affairs."17 The actions were based
on the same facts and eventually led to the revocation of the
shop's smog license." 8
4.

True Class Actions Versus Representative Actions

Another one of the controversial aspects the UCL was the
110. Id. at 334.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 337.
113. See, e.g., Setliff Bros. Serv. v. Bureau of Auto. Repair, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (auto repair shops were subject to a lawsuit brought by
the Attorney General and an administrative action by the Bureau of Automotive
Repair); People v. Damon, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (plaintiff
subject to an administrative action as well as a UCL action).
114. See generally Damon, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
115. Setliff, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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"representative" class action." 9
Before Proposition 64,
representative class actions allowed an individual plaintiff to
bring an action for an injunction or restitution on behalf of an
uncertified "class," regardless of whether the plaintiff was
personally harmed by the challenged acts of unfair
competition. 20 Many of the attorneys sanctioned for UCL
abuses filed these types of cases. Representative actions
under the UCL prior to Proposition 64 varied significantly
from true class actions. 121 Class actions must be certified by
the trial court only when the proponent of the certification
establishes the elements of a certified class. 122 Further, class
actions cannot be dismissed or settled without court

approval. 123
From a defendant's perspective, a true class action may
have advantages over a representative action. 124 First, the
increased cost of true class action litigation prevents a large
number of plaintiffs from bringing such actions. 2 5 True class
26 effect as to all class members. 127
actions have a res judicata
By contrast, settlements in representative actions on behalf of
the public do not bind the absent member of the general
to additional lawsuits arising
public, leaving defendants open
128
conduct.
unfair
same
the
from

119. See STERN, supra note 23, at 7-12.
120. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190, 195
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
121. Id. Before Proposition 64, true class actions were an option and could be
brought under section 17200. Corbett v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002). By certifying a section 17200 class, the plaintiffs were
allowed a broader range of remedies, including the use of fluid recovery funds.
Id. at 49. California's class action procedures are codified in California Code of
Civil Procedure section 382. Id. at 51; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382
(Deering 2004).
122. Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr 2d 320, 326 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001).
123. See, e.g., 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp., 102
Cal Rptr. 2d 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (approving a class action settlement
between 7-Eleven Owners and its parent business).
124. See STERN, supra note 23, at 7-20.
125. See id.
126. Res judicata is Latin term meaning "[aln issue that has been definitively
settled by judicial decision." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 133637.

127. See STERN, supra note 23, at 7-20.
128. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 718 (Cal. 2000).
Because representative class members are not actually parties to the action,
they can not be bound by the judgment or settlement. Id.
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For potential plaintiffs, there are both incentives and
disincentives to filing a representative claim under the
UCL. 1 29 By allowing parties to bring actions on behalf of the
public, public interest organizations are able to bring actions
against companies to enjoin unfair practices that harm the
public at large without having to go through timely and costly
class action procedures. 130 As one court expressed, "both
[true] consumer class actions and representative class UCL
actions serve important roles in the enforcement of
consumers' rights .... These actions supplement the efforts of
law enforcement and regulatory agencies. This court has
repeatedly recognized the importance of these private
enforcement efforts."' 3 '
Alternatively, a plaintiff may choose to certify the class
UCL claim, thereby making it a true class action. 132 One
motivation for certifying the class is that remedies under the
UCL are limited to restitution and injunction. 133 Remedies
such as fluid recovery 3 4 and cy pres 135 relief are only available
in true class action cases. 36 Furthermore, if the plaintiff
wants to file causes of action in addition to her UCL claim,
13
those causes of action must be brought as a class action.
Representative actions are also sometimes more difficult to
settle than true class actions because13 they do not ensure that
the defendant will not be sued again.

129. See STERN, supra note 23, at 7-20 to 7-21.
130. See id.
131. Kraus, 999 P.2d at 724-25.
132. See STERN, supra note 23, at 7-20 to 7-21.
133. See Corbett v. Superior Court 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 49 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
134. "Fluid recovery developed as a means by which to distribute the residue
of a favorable class action judgment remaining after payment to those class
members who have sufficient interest in obtaining recovery and can produce the
documentation necessary to file individual claims." Kraus, 999 P.2d at 725-26.
135. Cy pres is "tihe equitable doctrine under which a court reforms a
written instrument with a gift to charity as closely to the donor's intention as
possible, so that the gift does not fail. Courts use cy pres [especially] in
construing charitable gifts when the donor's original charitable purpose cannot
be fulfilled." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 415.
136. Kraus, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492-94.
137. Id. Only California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and
17500 allow actions on behalf of absent parties. Other causes of action require
class certification. See STERN, supra note 23, at 7-21.
138. See id.
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E. Publicity and the Campaignfor Proposition64
In the spring of 2003, the UCL started receiving bad
press. 139 The State Bar of California charged the Trevor Law
Group with thirty-six counts of misconduct, including making
misrepresentations and filing unjust actions under the
UCL. 4 ° The Trevor Law Group attorneys had incorporated
an organization called Consumer Enforcement Watch Corp.,
which purported to be a consumer protection organization.'
Subsequently, the Trevor Law Group filed twenty-eight
lawsuits, twenty-four on behalf of Consumer Enforcement
Watch, and sent letters to potential defendants-mostly auto
repair shops and restaurants-threatening audits and
reviews of their business records.
The letters contained false and misleading statements
regarding attorneys' fees that led potential defendants to
believe they would have to pay extremely high attorneys' fees
if they refused to settle quickly.'"
The lawyers also
encouraged the small businesses to settle confidentially to
keep the details from the courts and to keep settlement
payments under lawyer control.'" According to the State
Bar, the Trevor Law Group lawyers made fee agreements
with the plaintiff-client, Consumer Enforcement Watch,
which provided the attorneys with up to ninety percent of the
45
settlement money.
Further, the attorneys misinformed a charity, Helping
Hands for the Blind, about their motives and filed suits in the
charity's name. 46 In addition, to get a million-dollar advance,
they misrepresented to a lending institution that the
Attorney General was supporting their actions. 147
In
1 48
response, the State Bar put the lawyers on inactive status.
The attorneys, faced with the possibility of disbarment,

139. McCarthy, supra note 90, at 7.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142. Id.
143. Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45.
144. McCarthy, supra note 90, at 7.
145. Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 44.
146. Terry Carter, Sanctions May Rain Down After Flood of Lawsuits, 12
A.B.A. E-Report 4 (Mar. 28, 2003).
147. See Jeff Chorney, Attorney to Repay 17200 Settlement, THE RECORDER,
Mar. 25, 2004, at 5.
148. Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 42.
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resigned from the bar. 149 The Attorney General also filed an
action against the Trevor Law Group alleging that the
lawyers had engaged in unfair business practices and were
violating the UCL."5 °
During the spring of 2004, two more attorneys made
headlines for their misuse of the UCL. 1' 1 The Attorney
General charged attorney Harpreet Brar 5 2 of violating
section 17200.3
Brar had accused business owners of
violating unfair business practice laws. 5 4 Most of Brar's
victims were Vietnamese-owned nail salons that allegedly
155
applied nail polish from one bottle to many customers.
Brar was ordered to pay nearly $2 million in fines and
$11,200 in restitution to the ten businesses that represented
the most egregious cases.5 6
In addition, Sacramento solo practitioner Brian
Kindsvater was sued by the Attorney General after filing
lawsuits against travel agency websites, pornography sites,
spammers, bulk-faxers, and video stores. 5 7 Like the Trevor
Law Group, he formed a shell corporation called Consumer
Action League and sued businesses under the UCL.5 8 For
example, he sued over two hundred travel agents and
agencies for allegedly failing to post a business license
number on their websites. 159 Kindsvater agreed to return
$35,000 in settlement funds. 60
149. Id. Since resigning from the bar, one Trevor Law Group attorney has
opened a sports management agency in the law group's old law office, another
has returned to Canada, and the third is selling used cars. Lisa Muftoz,
California Businesses Seek to Limit Consumers' Ability to Sue with Initiative,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 4, 2004, at 1 [hereinafter Mufioz, California

Businesses].
150. Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 42. California Attorney General Bill
Lockyer called it a "delicious irony" that he was using section 17200 to enjoin
the Trevor Law Group attorneys. Id.
151. Mufioz, Lawyer Accused, supra note 99, at 1.
152. Id. Brar was apparently a classmate of the Trevor Law Group attorneys
at Western State University in Fullerton, California. Id.
153. Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 42.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Mufioz, Lawyer Accused, supra note 99, at 1.
157. Chorney, supra note 147, at 5.
158. Id.
159. Gilber Chan, Attorney Settles Complaint Over Travel-Agent Lawsuits,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 25, 2004, at D3.
160. Id.
The attorney for Kindsvater reported that the substance of
Kindsvater's lawsuits was not criticized, only the procedures he followed. Id.
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Armed with the publicity stemming from these
unscrupulous actions by a few attorneys, proponents of
Proposition 64 launched a successful campaign to reform the
law by eliminating the broad standing requirement and by
requiring UCL claims to comply with California Civil Code
section 382, a statute listing certain requirements for class
action cases.' 6 ' As stated by Bruce M. Brusavich, President of
the Consumer Attorneys of California, "the Trevor Law Group
has done a huge disservice to the legal profession. They have
maligned the intent of the UCL, which is despicable; they
have instilled fear in the small-business communities of
Southern California; and they have given the tort-reform
crowd a soapbox to stand on."162
The tort reformers began a powerful campaign, backed in
part by small businesses. 63 The largest contributors to the
campaign, however, were large corporations who had
previously been sued under the UCL.164 The money was
poured into a televised campaign that bombarded voters with
stories of small business owners being bullied by unethical
165
and unscrupulous lawyers.
One advertisement in the television campaign endorsing
Proposition 64 showed an unscrupulous attorney directing his
paralegals to send out letters demanding money from
businesses simply because they were financially capable of
paying a settlement. 1 66 The videos failed to show that the

161. See Steve Lawrence, Corporations Backing Competition Act Changes,
NEWS, July 26, 2004, at 3 [hereinafter Lawrence,
CorporationsBacking CompetitionAct Changes].
162. Terry Carter, Sanctions May Rain Down After Flood of Lawsuits, A.B.A.
J. E-REPORT, Mar. 28, 2003, at 4.
163. Lawrence, CorporationsBacking Competition Act Changes, supra note
161, at 3.
164. See id. Blue Cross donated $250,000 after a lawsuit was filed alleging
that it had switched customers to more expensive life insurance policies. Id.
Bank of American donated $100,000 after losing a lawsuit for misrepresenting
to customers that it had the right to take social security and disability funds
from their accounts to pay overdraft charges and other fees. Id. Microsoft gave
$100,000 to the effort, as it had been sued under section 17200 for failing to
alert customers of security flaws in its computer systems. Id. State Farm, after
losing a section 17200 claim for reducing earthquake coverage without adequate
notice and being forced to pay $100,000,000 in restitution to policy holders, gave
$100,000 to the effort. Id.
165. Ali Basye, California Businesses Take Advantage of Prop. 64, 15 CORP.
DESERT MORNING

LEGAL TIMES 70 (2005).

166. Paralegal(Yes on Prop. 64 Television Ads) (2004) (on file with author).
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attorneys who filed these types of lawsuits were disbarred or
fined. Campaign advertisements also failed to explain that
the vast majority of businesses sued under the UCL had
actually broken the law.16 7
Other advertisements depicted small business owners,
recently sued under the UCL, threatening to go out of
business or move out of the state. 168 While the threat of
businesses leaving the state is troubling, the advertisements
did not explain why or how Proposition 64 might solve this
problem, nor did they acknowledge that the law could be
effective in prosecuting companies that exploit consumers.
The purpose of Proposition 64, certainly, was never to exempt
small businesses from following the law.
Evidence of corporate support for Proposition 64 mounted
late in the campaign.
One newspaper reported that by
October 2004, Phillip Morris, Exxon, State Farm, Citigroup,
and General Motors had donated a combined $13 million to
back Proposition 64.169
One of the nation's largest car
retailers contributed more than $10 million to the effort. 7 °
Bank of America donated $100,000 to the campaign after a
jury found the bank had made misrepresentations to
customers about overdraft charges and other fees.'7 1 Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan also donated $100,000.12 Nike, once
sued for false advertising regarding poor working conditions
in factories in which its products were made, donated $50,000
173
to the "Yes on 64" campaign.
According to one consumer rights advocate, the amount
of corporate funding was excessive: "It's draconian. This is
moneyed corporations reaping the benefits of 64 to get out of
damaging lawsuits and their responsibilities."'7 4 The AARP,
167. Id.
168. Victim (Yes on Prop. 64 Television Ads) (2004) (on file with author);
RECOVERY (Yes on Prop. 64 Television Ads) (2004) (on file with author).
169. John Court, Prop. 64 Poisons Public, Not Lawyers, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at 4.
170. Kevin Yamamura, Lockyer Criticizes Prop. 64's Limits on Lawsuits,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 1, 2004, at A6.
171. Lawrence, Big CompaniesFight, supra note 3, at 4.
172. Id. Kaiser had been sued a number of times under the UCL, including
once for purportedly falsely advertising the way in which patient care decisions
were made and in another case alleging that the company split patients' pills.
Id.
173. Id.
174. Basye, supra note 165, at 1.
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Sierra Club, Center for

Environmental Health, Foundation for Taxpayer and
Consumer Rights, and the Attorney General each opposed
Proposition 64.17 However, on November 2, 2004, Proposition
64 passed with a fifty-nine percent majority vote.
The
newly enacted Proposition 64 would later be referred to as "an
over-fix [consisting of] a very bad public policy that will soon
77
cause its own harm.'1
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL ISSUE

This comment has identified the weaknesses in the UCL.
Next, it will analyze whether Proposition 64 successfully
solves the issues it was enacted to cure. In particular, the
comment will address whether the new, narrow standing
requirements will solve the problems of unscrupulous
attorneys abusing the UCL. The legal issue has thus become
whether and how Californians can save the UCL to once
again protect consumers while at the same time protecting
businesses from unscrupulous lawyers.
Unfortunately,
Proposition 64 fails to discourage devious attorneys from
filing and settling UCL claims, 178 fails to ensure that business
defendants will not be faced with simultaneous UCL actions
by public and private parties,'7 9 and fails to protect
consumers against potentially harmful business practices. s

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Purpose of Proposition64
Proposition 64 limits the right to sue under the UCL to
plaintiffs who had actually suffered injury from unfair
business practices.'
Further, the Proposition may require
class actions when individuals attempt to bring actions on

175. SECY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, CAL. GENERAL

ELECTION 41 (Nov. 2,2004).

176. Lisa Mufioz, Lawyers, Businesses Debate Effect of New Limits on
California Consumer Lawsuits, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 9, 2004, at
Business 3 [hereinafter Mufioz, Lawyers, Businesses Debate].
177. Basye, supra note 165, at 1.
178. See Mufioz, CaliforniaBusinesses, supra note 149, at 1.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 175, at 109.
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behalf of the public. 8 2 However, the Attorney General or
local government prosecutors can still bring actions on behalf
of the public.'8 3
The text of Proposition 64 specifically points out that its
purpose is to eliminate frivolous UCL lawsuits that clog the
courts. 1'
It also expresses concern that uninjured plaintiffs
can sue businesses without having used the "defendant's
product or service, viewed the defendant's advertising, or had
any other business dealing with the defendant."8 ' According
to the text, the voters believe that only the Attorney General
and other government attorneys should be able to file actions
on behalf of the public. 8 6
B. Problems with Proposition64
Attorneys Can Still File UnscrupulousActions
The effect of Proposition 64 has been described by the
following statement: "obviously, there are systems in place to
eliminate the bad apples. You just don't want to put another
system in place and throw away all of the good apples."'8 7 By
adding a standing requirement, proponents of Proposition 64
attempted to prevent lawyers such as those of the Trevor Law
Group from filing frivolous cases. 8 8 While advertised as
being the solution to frivolous "shakedown lawsuits," it is
unlikely that Proposition 64 will put an end to such cases.8 9
One consumer advocate suspects that it will prevent only
about fifteen percent of the egregious UCL claims.' 90
Furthermore, many of the most egregious cases will not
be prevented by the changes Proposition 64 made to the
UCL.' 9 1 For example, in the case of the firm that sued nail
salons over reuse of nail polish, the attorney could have easily
1.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

187. Our Views, supra note 104, at 10.
188. See Mufioz, Lawyers, Businesses Debate, supra note 176, at Business 3.
189. See Mufioz, CaliforniaBusinesses, supra note 149, at 1.
190. See Mufioz, Lawyers, Businesses Debate, supra note 176, at Business 3.
The referenced advocate is Sharon Arkin, president of Consumer Attorney's of
California. Id.
191. See Mufioz, CaliforniaBusinesses, supra note 149, at 1.
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recruited a number of women to get manicures or pedicures
at the salons within the same day or two. 192 The women could
then claim to have suffered an injury.19 3 As a result, they
would have standing to file an unfair competition action
under the new version of the statute.9
Another pre-Proposition 64 case further illustrates the
point. In that case, an attorney filed an action under the
UCL against Wal-Mart for offering a "Ladies Day" discount
on oil changes.1 95 The plaintiff-client purposely went to WalMart instead of his usual mechanic for an oil change and
intentionally did not ask for the discount. 9 6 All of this took
place after the plaintiff had met and discussed the case with
his attorney. 197 This manipulation of the UCL is still
legitimate after Proposition 64 because the plaintiff is a party
that "has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or
property as a result of such unfair competition." 19 According
to one consumer advocate: "There are bad people in every
single profession. But instead of stopping shady lawyers, this
proposition unjustly protects HMOs, banks and other
businesses. There are other ways to root out bad actions
without eliminating consumer and public protections."'9 9
The best way to stop unscrupulous and unethical
lawsuits is to take away the attorney's motivation to file such
actions2 0 0 while at the same time ensuring that legitimate
attorneys will not be discouraged from using the UCL on
behalf of their clients. 20 ' A number of solutions have been
proposed.0 2
One solution is for the court to "freely
192. See Mufioz, Lawyers, Businesses Debate,supra note 176, at Business 3.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. John H. Sullivan, Call It Gonzo Law; The Unfair Competition Statute
Covers Any Claim if It's Presented with a Straight Face, CAL. L. BUs., Jan. 10,
2000, at 22, availableat http'//www.cjac.org/legislation/bp17200/gonzo.html.
196. See id. Apparently, Wal-Mart will give the discount to anyone who asks
for it on "Ladies Day", including men. Id.
197. See id.
198. See Cal. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (Deering 2004).
199. Pondel, supra note 100, at B1.
200. Joshua Taylor, Why the Increasing Role of Public Policy in California's
Unfair Competition Law is a Slippery Step in the Wrong Direction, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 1131 (2001); James M. Wagstaffe, Implications of 17200 Claims, PRAc. L.
INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 371, 381-82 (Aug.
2004).
201. Taylor, supra note 200, at 1147.
202. Id.
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incorporate the unclean hands doctrine of abstention" in cases
where it is obvious that the attorney misused the UCL to
garner attorneys' fees, 20 3 as the trial court is in the best

position to judge whether cases are frivolous.204
Unfortunately, many of the cases brought for less than noble
reasons0 5 settle out of court and are never scrutinized by a

judge.

2

Another solution is to use the UCL against the attorneys
who abuse it, 20 6 as the Attorney General has already done

with some lawyers.0 7 Ultimately, while a few attorneys may
be deterred by the possibility of future action against them,
this method fails insofar as it does not prevent the problem
until after the abuse has already occurred. 20 8 A better remedy

would be to keep attorneys from filing unscrupulous actions
from the start.0 9
The best proposal to curb unscrupulous tactics involving
the UCL is to eliminate any incentive attorneys may have to
file frivolous UCL lawsuits.

20

A revision of the UCL could

"'
require that attorneys' fees must be approved by the court.21
Under this proposed solution, after finding liability, the judge
would have to approve any award of attorneys' fees.21 2 In
addition, prior to a finding of liability, the court would have to
approve any settlement, including offers of attorneys' fees .213
This solution solves the problem of unscrupulous
attorneys who take advantage of the law because it
eliminates any monetary incentive to file the lawsuit.1 4
Threats of hefty attorneys' fees, like those threatened by the
Trevor Law Group, were likely a deciding factor in achieving
quick settlements.215 It is less likely that the Trevor Law
Group would have even threatened to file suit if it was clear

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
Sullivan, supra note 195, at 22.
Wagstaffe, supra note 200, at 371.
See Leoni v. State Bar Ass'n, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Cal. 1985).
Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45.
Id.
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they would receive no monetary benefit from the action.216
This type of amendment to the UCL would allow legitimate
attorneys to protect their
livelihoods while penalizing those
217
who file frivolous suits.
2.

DefendantsAre Still Subject to Simultaneous Public,
Private, and Administrative Suits

The changes to the UCL by Proposition 64 do not protect
defendants from being forced to fight two or even three front
wars; however, the possibility of this happening has
significantly diminished with the addition of Proposition 64's
"actual injury" requirement.2 18
Prior to Proposition 64,
parties alleged of violating the UCL could be sued
simultaneously by uninjured private parties and government
entities.2 19 Now that private parties must have standing,2 2 ° it
is less likely that defendants will find themselves fighting two
or three front wars. Nevertheless, defendants may find
themselves in court against both administrative agencies and
government attorneys, 221 as different government agencies
serve different functions and none are prohibited 22by
2
Proposition 64 from bringing actions on the public's behalf.
Should defendants find themselves fighting both private
parties and public entities concurrently, the legislature could
solve this problem by requiring private parties to give the
Attorney General notice of the action, which gives the
Attorney General time to decide if a public entity should take
over the case.2 23 If a public entity takes the case, it should be
required to include the private attorneys' costs and expenses
when calculating any costs for a settlement. 224 This method
solves two problems. First, it eliminates businesses' concerns
about defending against both public and private parties at the

216. See STERN, supra note 23, at 7-6.
217. Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45 ("Lawyers, like everyone else,
have to eat.").
218. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (Deering 2004).
219. See, e.g., Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. A Free Pregnancy Ctr., 280
Cal. Rptr. 329, 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
220. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203.
221. See FELLMETH, supra note 87, at 26-27.
222. See, e.g., Setliff Bros. Serv. v. Bureau of Auto. Repair, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
25, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
223. FELLMETH, supra note 87, at 26.
224. Id. at 27.
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same time. Second, it offsets the costs imposed on a
financially burdened Attorney General's Office by taking
actions that the State lacks the staffing or funding to
pursue.225

Historically, private parties have played an

important role in meritorious consumer protection cases, and
they will likely continue to do so. 226 It is unlikely that the

Attorney General will take over many cases; however, this
method would allow the Attorney General to regulate
potentially conflicting actions.227
3. PrivateAttorneys Are Unable to ProtectConsumers
Proposition 64 suggests that plaintiffs may have to
certify a class before bringing an action for restitution on
behalf of others.228 On one hand, this requirement ensures
that settlement of UCL cases will have a res judicata effect,
which would thus protect businesses from multiple private
suits.

22 9

On the other hand, class actions significantly raise

the cost of litigation in many legitimate consumer actions and
would unfortunately limit many consumer protection
lawsuits.23°

When a plaintiffs interest is similar to the interests of
the public at large, it may be appropriate to bring an action to
enjoin a company on behalf of the public.23 ' In addition to
bringing a tort action, an injured plaintiff should be able to
enjoin businesses from further unfair business practices.232
Unfortunately, Proposition 64 could eliminate the injured
plaintiffs ability to bring an uncertified representative action
on behalf of the public, even if there could be a significant
public benefit.233
The California state budget is currently facing a variety
of cuts, including the elimination of thirty-two boards and
commissions.234 These cuts threaten to leave consumers
225. See Landhuis, supra note 4, at lB.
226. FELLMETH, supra note 87, at 26-27.

227.
actions
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 28. Similar procedures are used in taxpayer waste qui tam
and federal employment discrimination civil rights complaints. Id.
See STERN, supra note 23, at 7-20.
See id.
See id.
Landhuis, supra note 4, at lB.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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vulnerable to unfair business practices and with an
insufficient number of government agencies to protect public
health and safety. One way to combat this problem would be
to allow certain injured plaintiffs to use the UCL to enjoin
companies on the public's behalf.2 35 To ensure that this cause
of action is not abused, the legislature could require approval
by the Attorney General before an action is commenced.
Attorney General approval would simultaneously prevent
abuse by unscrupulous attorneys and at the same time allow
legitimate consumer advocates to protect the public safety
and welfare.
V. PROPOSALS
Proposition 64 fails to protect the UCL from abuse by
unscrupulous attorneys. 6 Further, the changes made by
Proposition 64 fail to address the problem of businesses
having to defend simultaneous cases brought by private
plaintiffs and public entities.237 Perhaps the biggest failure of
Proposition 64 is that it eliminates the ability of legitimate
and ethical attorneys to bring protective actions on behalf of
the public during a time of increased budget cuts to
government consumer protection agencies.238 Proposed below
are three additions to the UCL that, if enacted by the
legislature, could effectively solve these problems while
retaining the spirit and purpose behind Proposition 64.
A. Attorneys' Fees Must Be Approved by the Court
To eliminate potentially frivolous lawsuits, the
legislature should look at attorneys' incentives for filing an
action.23 9 In some cases, lawyers act in the consumers' best
interest and file legitimate and important actions to protect
the public.24 ° In rare cases, however, attorneys file actions

235. See FELLMETH, supra note 87, at 26. Another solution already utilized
by the Attorney General is to hire private plaintiffs' attorneys as contract
lawyers to take suits too large or complex for the Attorney General's Office. See
Justin Scheck, PlaintiffFirms Offer to Take Cases from the AG, THE RECORDER,

Feb. 8, 2005, at 1.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See FELLMETH, supra note 87, at 26-27.
See id. at 26.
Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45.
Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45.
Id.
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solely to acquire attorneys' fees through quick settlements.2 4 1
To prevent attorneys from abusing the UCL, the latter
incentive must be eliminated2 42 by adding the following
language to section 17200: "Attorneys filing actions under
California Business & Professions Code section 17200 on
behalf of the public are not entitled to attorneys' fees without
receiving judicial approval based on California Civil Code
section 1021.5 or another independent basis for attorneys'
fees." This statute would significantly deter unscrupulous
actions, yet award reasonable attorneys' fees to attorneys
filing real and meaningful claims. Because they would have
to seek court approval for fees even at the settlement stage,
lawyers, such as those in the Trevor Law Group, will not be
able to quickly and quietly settle their UCL cases.
B. Require PrivatePlaintiffs to Notify the Attorney General
Priorto Filing UCL Actions
By adding a standing requirement, Proposition 64 may
have eliminated the problem of defendants who concurrently
fight both private and public actions.2 43 If, however, the
legislature finds this a common occurrence in the future, it
should enact legislation that requires notice to the Attorney
General, thereby giving public prosecutors an opportunity to
file cases independently and allowing the Attorney General's
Office to monitor ongoing UCL cases.24 4 The following is a
sample statute:
A private litigant commencing an action under section
17200 must first submit his or her proposed civil
complaint to the Attorney General. The public authorities
will have sixty (60) days to prosecute the case. If any
public prosecutor decides to pursue the matter she or he
must include all of the reasonable costs and fees incurred
by the private plaintiff and his or her counsel.24 5
The sixty-day requirement gives public offices sufficient
time to decide whether the public's interest would be better

241. See id.

242. Id.
243. FELLMETH, supra note 87, at 27.
244. Id.

245. Fellmeth makes a similar proposal, but suggests sixty days for the
Attorney General to decide to take the case. See id.
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served by public prosecution of the case."'
C. Private Plaintiffs Can Bring Actions on Behalf of Those
Similarly Situated
Proposition 64 severely decreased an attorney's ability to
bring actions that could benefit the public,24 7 particularly
actions on behalf of consumers who often fall victim to unfair
Since the State's budget cuts,
business practices.24"
even
more susceptible to unfair and
consumers have become
2
49
One remedy to this situation
unlawful business practices.
would be to allow injured plaintiffs to bring representative
actions enjoining a business from continuing its harmful
practices. By requiring the Attorney General to approve
these actions before they are filed, the intent of voters who
approved Proposition 64 would be upheld because only the
The
Attorney General could authorize UCL actions. 250
legislature could add a phrase to the end of section 17203 that
reads: "A person entitled to bring an action under this section
may, if the unfair practice has caused similar injury to other
persons similarly situated and the person is an adequate
representative of the similarly situated persons, bring a civil
action on behalf of those persons."25 1 This legislation would
likely provide effective protection to consumers while still
protecting businesses from meritless actions.
VI. CONCLUSION

For decades, California's UCL has been in force to protect

246.
247.
248.
249.

See id.
Mufioz, Lawyers, Businesses Debate, supra note 176, at Business 3.
See Landhuis, supra note 4, at lB.
See id.

250. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 175, at 109.

251. This language is inspired in part by California Labor Code section
2699(a). This labor law, often known as the "Sue Your Boss" statute, allows an
aggrieved employee to bring a civil action on behalf of other employees. See
CAL. LABOR CODE § 2699 (Deering 2004). The labor statute differs from the
proposed statute insofar as it provides for civil penalties, not injunction and
restitution. See id. The labor statute and the proposed statute are similar in
that the rationale for the laws is the same: to provide a means of collecting civil
penalties during a time when the Attorney General's Office does not have the
funds and resources to do so itself. Ben Nicholsen, Businesses Beware: Chapter
906 Deputizes 17 Million PrivateAttorneys General to Enforce the Labor Code,
35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 581, 585-86 (2004).
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consumers. 25 2 With the passage of Proposition 64 and the
elimination of many consumer protection agencies due to
budget cuts, consumers are at an increased risk of not
receiving adequate protection in the marketplace. 53 At the
same time, small businesses have not been protected by
legislation intended to immunize them from frivolous
lawsuits. 54
To solve these problems, the California legislature should
reevaluate the UCL and again amend the law. First, it
should eliminate the incentive for unscrupulous attorneys to
bring unfair competition actions. 25 5 Next, the legislature
should protect small businesses by eliminating the possibility
that these businesses will have to defend against lawsuits by
both private parties and public entities simultaneously.2 56
Finally, the legislature should enact a statute that allows
private plaintiffs, in limited circumstances, to file actions on
behalf of the public.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45.
See Landhuis, supra note 4, at lB.
See Mufioz, Lawyers, Businesses Debate, supra note 176, at Business 3.
See Disner & Jussim, supra note 71, at 45.
See FELLMETH, supra note 87, at 26.
See generally Landhuis, supra note 4, at lB.

